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Abstract 
Malware writers often use packing technique to hide malicious payload. A number of dynamic unpacking tools are 
designed in order to identify and extract the hidden code in the packed malware. However, such unpacking methods 
are all based on a highly controlled environment that is vulnerable to various anti-unpacking techniques. If execution 
environment is suspicious, malwares may stay inactive for a long time or stop execution immediately to evade 
detection. In this paper, we proposed a novel approach that automatically reasons about the environment requirements 
imposed by malware, then directs a unpacking tool to change the controlled environment to extract the hide code at 
the new environment.  The experimental results show that our approach significantly increases the resilience of the 
traditional unpacking tools to environment-sensitive malware. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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11 ...  Introduction 
Most malwares are packed to complicate malware analysis and evade malware detection. It has been 
reported that the percentage of packed malware is rising to more than 80% in 2008[5]. This situation is 
further complicated by the ease of obtaining and modifying the source code of various packers. Currently, 
new packers are created from existing ones at a rate of 10 to 15 per month[9]. 
However, no matter what packing technique is applied, the hidden code or its equivalent must 
eventually be present in memory and get executed at run-time. By taking advantage of this intrinsic nature, 
many unpacking tools have been developed to automatically extract the packed code without requiring 
knowledge of the packing technique used by malware, e.g., PolyUnpack[1], Renovo[2], OmniUnpack[3] 
and others.  
The dynamic unpacking tools are all based on a highly controlled environment to passively or actively 
monitor the written-then-executed behaviors of malware. However, the controlled environment will 
significantly increase the execution overhead that exposes the existence of unpacking tools. Ferrie 
presented many anti-unpacking tricks to check the existence of controlled environment[11], including anti-
dumping, anti-debugging, anti-emulating, and anti-intercepting. And Liu et al. proposed a scheme[10] that 
introduces a spurious unpacking behavior and detects abnormal execution overhead to identify the 
existence of unpacking tools. When malwares are aware of the existence of unpacking environment, it may 
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stay inactive for a long period or stop execution immediately, even perform denial-of-service attacks to the 
unpacking tools[10]. 
With the help of various anti-unpacking techniques, malwares are becoming sensitive to execution 
environment. However, regardless of what anti-unpacking technique is used, there must be an execution 
environment that satisfies the malware’s unpacking requirements, that the hidden code is present in 
memory and get executed eventually. In this paper, we proposed a new approach that uses the dependence 
of control flow of packed malware on execution environment to improve the resilience of dynamic 
unpacking tools to most anti-unpacking techniques. This work is inspired by recent advances in multiple-
path exploration technique[6,15]. It starts with a fully correct and detailed program execution trace. When 
unpacking hidden code failed, our approach will generalize the trace to collect branch conditions 
corresponding to execution environment, and predict the possible execution environment in which 
unpacking routine might be executed, then change the controlled environment to make malware unaware 
of the existence of the unpacking tool. This process is repeated using a novel path-searching heuristic that 
each path indicates a new execution environment. 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: 
z Propose a directed hidden code extractor that is directed by the internal logic of the environment-
sensitive malware, and changes the environment to satisfy the requirements imposed by malwares. 
z Propose a new path-selecting algorithm to find a appropriate environment from many possible 
execution paths. 
z Implement a prototype and evaluate on the real-world environment-sensitive malware. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present existing dynamic unpacking tools. 
Section 3 discusses the challenges of environment-sensitive malwares and gives a overview of our 
approach. In section 4, we present the design choices and implementation. Section 5 presents the 
evaluation of our approach. We include in Section 6. 
22 ... Relative Works 
Extracting the hidden code from a packed binary is one of the major challenges to malware analysis. There 
are several recent attempts using dynamic unpacking methods, most notably PolyUnpack[1], Renovo[2] 
and OmniUnpack[3]. Table 1 illustrates the working environments and monitor methods of the 3 notably 
tools and our prototype. PolyUnpack[1] builds a static code view of the program and uses debugging 
technique to single step the execution to check the executed instruction whether outside the static code 
view. Renovo[2] uses QEMU emulator to track unpacking process, considering the execution of newly-
generated code. OmniUnpack[3] leverages the page-level interceptor to identify when code is executed 
from a page that was newly modified. Those unpacking environments are all fixed that can’t dynamically 
change according to the characters of malwares.  The environment sensitive malwares  can recognize the 
existence of the controlled environment and then change their behavior to evade detection.  
TABLE I. DESIGN OF DYNAMIC UNPACKERS
System Environment Monitor 
PolyUnpack Fixed Debugger 
Renovo Fixed Emulator 
OmniUnpack Fixed Interceptor 
DirectedUnpack Dynamic Emulator 
33 ... Problem Statement and Approach Overview 
The main limitations of dynamic unpacking tools are code coverage that only single execution path is 
observed and the controlled environment is explicit to malwares. Then malwares are likely to mislead the 
unpacking tool to a benign execution path or an infinite loop to hide the malicious payload. Table 2 
illustrates several anti-unpacking techniques commonly used by environment sensitive malwares. Anti-
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debugging and anti-emulating techniques[11,12] are used to bypass unpacking tools there is a debugger 
or an emulator running. The CPU bugs, model-specific registers, and alignment checking are also could 
be used to detecting system emulators. Our paper is concerned with the methods based on API outputs 
and values of specific memory.  
TABLE II. A LIST OF ANTI-UNPACKING TECHNIQUES 
Packing Tools Checking Type Checking Point 
Shrinker API Check KiUserExceptionDispatcher() 
MSLRH API Check NtQueryInformationProcess() 
Yoda's Protector API Check SuspendThread() 
ExeCryptor Memory Check PEB-> NtGlobalFlag 
Yoda's Crypter Memory Check Section table 
HyperUnpackMe2 Memory Check Eprocess->NoDebugInherit 
No matter what anti-unpacking methods are used, the original malicious payload is present and 
executed along one execution path under certain execution environment eventually. We proposed a 
mechanism that automatically directs an unpacking tool to cover multiple execution paths. Each path 
indicates a new execution environment. Then it improves the resilience of the unpacking tool to anti-
unpacker techniques. Figure 1 shows an overview of our approach, consisting 4 components: controlled 
unpacking environment, symbolic execution, constraints solver and path-selecting heuristic. 
Modifying the 
environment
Figure 1. Overview of the directed hidden-code extraction 
If the initial controlled unpacking environment satisfies the malware’s requirements, along the 
execution of the packed malware, the hidden code is present in memory that the further analysis about 
how to change the execution environment is not needed. If the environment does not meet the 
requirements of the malware, we need to reason about the path constraints and try to generate a new 
execution environment to satisfy the requirements and induce the malware to present the hidden code.  
As shown in Figure 1, the process of generating a new environment for a environment sensitive 
malware consists four steps: 
z Step 1: Record the detailed concrete execution trace of the packed malware in the highly 
controlled unpacking environment. 
z Step 2: The symbolic execution component observes the trace recorded by controlled unpacking 
environment to search the computations which are affected by the environment, such as system 
time ,operation system properties and so on, then builds a logical formula describing the 
relationship between the control flow of malware and the current execution environment. The 
logical formula is  composed of many branch constraints. 
z Step 3: The branch constraints are then systematically negated and solved with the constraint 
solver to see whether the new logical formula can be satisfied, indicating whether the 
corresponding new execution path are feasible. 
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z Step 4: By using the path selecting heuristic, our approach then selects the next path that most 
likely to trigger unpacking behavior of malware from the set of feasible paths for further 
analyzing. According the selected path, our approach dynamically changes the controlled 
environment to satisfy the requirements of the new execution path. 
44 ... System Design and Implementation 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we design and implement a prototype to extend the 
ability of the dynamic unpacking tool to change the controlled environment dynamically according the 
malware’s internal logic. In this section, we will present the design and implementation of these 
components in turn. 
4.1 Controlled Unpacking Environment 
When analyzing a packed malware, we first run it in a controlled environment which is monitored by 
a dynamic unpacking tool. In our approach, the controlled environment is base on Qemu[13], a fast 
emulator that relies on dynamic binary translation. Using Qemu’s emulation, a Windows XP guest 
operation system is installed that is motivated by the fact that most malwares are running on this platform. 
And the dynamic unpacking tool we implemented is similar to OmniUnpack[3], PaX PAGEEXEC1 and 
OllyBone 2  that takes advantage of page-level break-on-execution to monitor written-then-executed 
memory pages. We use TEMU to record the detailed execution trace, that is a dynamic analysis 
component of the BitBlaze[6] binary analysis platform which is an open source software. If the unpacking 
behavior is not triggered at current execution environment, then the trace is passed to the following 
components, analyzing the effect of environment on the malware's execution trace. 
4.2 Symbolic Execution 
Symbolic execution[8] is a natural extension of normal execution which has been proposed for more 
than three decades and is becoming a powerful and fundamental technique in security analysis. It supplies 
symbols representing arbitrary concrete values. The execution proceeds as in a normal execution except 
that values may be symbolic formulas over the input symbols. Symbolic execution can be used to 
discover the dependence of control flow on environment, which can be used to guide dynamic analysis 
tools to reason about properties of all execution paths. 
In execution trace, each conditional jump depending on tainted memory or API output, will generate 
two path predicates: one for the current path continuing with the true branch, and one for the current path 
continuing with the false branch. The predicate is therefore the constraint which make the malware go 
down that path. After obtaining the concrete execution trace of the packed malware, our approach 
incorporating symbolic execution technique symbolically executes the trace and collects constraints from 
branch conditions that affected by execution environment, then generates a logical symbolic formula set 
describing the path. 
In our prototype, first we use the TEMU to taint the environment related memory e.g. PEB (Process 
Environment Block), and the output of sensitive system APIs, e.g. NtQueryInformatinoProcess() , which 
might be used by anti-unpack techniques. Then, the taint analysis engine in TEMU monitors the taint 
propagation at run-time and writes the tainted instructions into the trace. Second, we use the VINE which 
is the static analysis component of the BitBlaze platform to disassemble the trace and transform the 
disassembly language into a platform-independent intermediate language(IL). Assembly codes are 
complex and have implicit side effects. IL is a small and formally specified language that faithfully 
represents the assembly language without side effects that reduces the difficulty of following analysis. 
                                                          
1 PaX Team. PaX PAGEEXEC: paging based nonexecutable pages. http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pageexec.txt
2 J. Stewart. OllyBonE. http://www.joestewart.org/ollybone/
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Third, we extract the constraints from the branch conditions by symbolic execution on the trace. The 
collected constraints are useful for the following further analysis on the  feasible execution paths. 
4.3 Constraint Solver 
The constraint solver is a theorem prover or decision procedure, which reasons about the symbolic 
formula. For each conditional instruction, an execution trace only covered one branch, and the other 
branch indicates a new execution path not covered. The uncovered path predicates will then be given to 
the constraint solver to see whether the potential new execution paths can be satisfied by changing the 
execution environment. In our approach, the collected constraints are negated one by one and solved with 
constraint solver to find all feasible paths which are uncovered. Each feasible path is then added to a set 
of paths for further exploring. For each feasible path the constraint solver also returns the corresponding 
execution environment to drive the malware to execute along that path. 
In our implementation, we use STP[7], a decision procedure optimized for bit-vector and array data 
types, as the solver. STP has been widely used in many software analysis projects, including vulnerability 
finding, hardware verification, test case generation, malware analysis and so on. 
4.4 Path Selecting Heuristic 
After all potential paths along the trace are discovered, our approach needs to decide which path to 
pick from the set of feasible paths for the next exploring. There are different heuristics for this job, for 
example, breadth-first search, depth-first search, generational search, and other strategies. We present a 
new search strategy that is designed to trigger unpacking routine of malware as early as possible. This 
new strategy has two parts: "Infinite-loop Search" and "Best-Last Search". When the execution of 
malware runs out of memory, or takes too long to return an answer, e.g., DoS attack, our approach would 
try to explore the branch that terminates the infinite loop. Otherwise, the last branch will be selected. We 
have found this strategy is more effective than other strategies at uncovering malicious hidden codes in 
the real-world samples we tested. 
55 ... Evaluation 
In order to test the effective of our approach, we have evaluated our prototype on 121 real-world malware 
samples that are sensitive to execution environment including trojan, worm, backdoor and adware. All of 
our experiments were performed on a 2.66Ghz Pentium quad-core processor with 4 GB of RAM. Our 
experiments demonstrate that our approach is capable of extracting hidden code from real-world 
environment-sensitive samples.  
In some cases the malware may not terminate within a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, in our 
experiments each malware execution was bounded by a 5-minute timeout.  
TABLE III. OUR RESULTS ON SEVERAL REAL-WORLD MALWARE SAMPLES
Malware Inst Branch Taint STP Time Tested 
Trojan-QQPass 140173 21296 11 0.4 min 2 
Backdoor-ZZSlash 1615646 90826 15 2.3 min 3 
Worm-AutoRun 17592 4000 6 0.1 min 2 
Adware-Zhongsou 4852781 570323 23 3.1 min 5 
Table 3 illustrates 4 analysis results of our experiments. In this table, the “Malware” column is the 
name of the tested samples. The “Inst” column is the total number of instructions in the sample’s 
execution trace. The “Branch” column is the number of execution branches discovered along the 
execution trace. Each conditional jump instruction in the malware’s execution trace indicates a execution 
branch. We found some malwares use SEH(Structured Exception Handling) scheme to transfer control 
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without conditional jump instructions, that is not supported by our approach currently. 
The “Taint” column counts how many branch conditions were based on execution environment. This 
number is important because it demonstrates that a relatively small number of branches need to be 
explored in order to discover hidden code in the environment-sensitive malware. We also show the time 
used by STP to solving the branch conditions. In the “Tested” column is the number of execution paths 
that tested by out prototype. These numbers indicate that our heuristic algorithm can quickly find out the 
right execution path and its corresponding execution environment from feasible paths. 
5.1 Limitation 
There are some branch conditions are difficult to be solved. For example, in “if (SHA1(x)==y)”, it’s 
not able to solve for x for the comparison to be true by STP. And the branch conditions based on floating 
point number is not supported. 
Some malwares don’t use the system memory nor the output of system API to check the presence of 
the controlled environment. For example, the malicious code may measure elapsed time for certain 
instructions, because emulating these instructions incurs high overhead [14], or check the results of 
certain instructions (e.g., sidt), because the results they generate are different under real and emulated 
environments (e.g., redpill test3 ). 
66 ... Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed that by dissecting the internal logic of the environment-sensitive malware to 
dynamically changing unpacking environment and direct malware’s execution is possible. We designed 
and implemented a prototype using symbolic execution as a first step towards this goal.  And we 
introduced a new search algorithm that better leverages expensive symbolic execution tasks. In our 
experiments with real-world malware, we demonstrate that our approach is capable of seasoning about the 
relationship between malware and execution environment then directing dynamic unpacking tool to 
extract the hidden code by changing execution environment.  
Future work includes the improvement of our prototype implementation and the path selecting 
heuristic.  
77 ... Acknowledgment 
This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 60973141, 
the Natural Science Foundation of Tianjin under grant 09JCYBJ00300 and the Specialized Research Fund 
for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China under grant 20100031110030. 
References 
[1] P. Royal, M. Halpin, D. Dagon, R. Edmonds, and W. Lee. Polyunpack: Automating the hidden-code extraction of 
unpack-executing malware. In Proceedings of 2006 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pages 289–300. 
IEEE Computer Society, 2006. 
[2] M.G. Kang, P. Poosankam, and H. Yin. Renovo: A hidden code extractor for packed executables. In Proceedings of the 
2007 ACM workshop on Recurring malcode (WORM), pages 46–53, 2007. 
[3] L. Martignoni, M. Christodorescu, and S. Jha. Omniunpack: Fast, generic, and safe unpacking of malware. In 
Proceedings of the 2007 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference(ACSAC), pages 431–441. IEEE Computer Society, 
2007. 
                                                          
3 Red Pill. http://invisiblethings.org/papers/redpill.html.
Chunfu Jia et al. / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1621 – 1627 1627
7 Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
[4] M. Sharif, V. Yegneswaran, H. Saidi, P. Porras, and W. Lee. Eureka: A framework for enabling static malware analysis. 
In Proceedings of 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), pages 481–500, 2008. 
[5] M. Morgenstern and A. Marx. Runtime packer testing experiences. In Proceedings of the 2nd International CARO 
Workshop, 2008. 
[6] D. Song, D. Brumley, H. Yin, J. Caballero, I. Jager, M. G. Kang, Z. Liang, J. Newsome, P. Poosankam, and P. Saxena. 
BitBlaze: A new approach to computer security via binary analysis. In International Conference on Information Systems Security,
Hyderabad, India, December 2008. Keynote invited paper. 
[7] Ganesh, V., Dill, D.L.: A decision procedure for bit-vectors and arrays. In: Damm, W., Hermanns, H. (eds.) CAV 2007. 
LNCS, vol. 4590, pp. 524_536. Springer, Heidelberg (2007). 
[8] J. King. Symbolic execution and program testing. Communications of the ACM, 19(7), 1976. 
[9] A. Stepan. Improving proactive detection of packed malware. In Virus Bulletin,pages 11–13, 2006. 
[10] L. Liu, J. Ming, Z. Wang, D. Gao and C. Jia. Denial-of-service attacks on host-based generic unpackers. In Proceedings 
of 11th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2009, Dec.14,2009. 
[11] P. Ferrie. Anti-Unpacker Tricks. In Proc. of the 2nd International CARO Workshop, 2008. 
[12] T. Raffetseder, C. Krugel, and E. Kirda. Detecting system emulators. In Proceedings of 10th International Conference on 
Information Security (ISC), pages 1–18, 2007. 
[13] F. Bellard. Qemu, a Fast and Portable Dynamic Translator.In Usenix Annual Technical Conference, 2005. 
[14] M. Vrable, J. Ma, J. Chen, D. Moore, E. Vandekieft, A. Snoeren, G. Voelker, and S. Savage. Scalability,fidelity and 
containment in the potemkin virtual honeyfarm. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), 
October 2005. 
[15] A. Moser, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda. Exploring multiple execution paths for malware analysis. In Proceedings of the 
IEEE Symposium of Security and Privacy, 2007. 
